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When Stanley Baldwin retired as prime minister and Conservative party leader in May 1937 several assessments of his career were possible, some critical but most of them favourable : as Churchill wrote, he left office 'loaded with honours and enshrined in public esteem ' .
1 Yet three years later his reputation collapsed, as an extraordinary and in retrospect implausible degree of blame was focused upon him, most notably by the pseudonymous ' Cato ' in Guilty men. During the 1940s and early 1950s the hostile verdict became an historical ' truth ' -not just a public belief but an academic orthodoxy, given apparent confirmation by the first volume of Churchill's war memoirs in 1948 and even by the book Baldwin commissioned as a defence three years before his death in December 1947, of MacDonald's cabinet, Baldwin from late 1933 spoke repeatedly of the dangers from dictatorships ; in May 1934 he promised 'parity' in air power with Germany ; and in July announced an expansion of the Royal Air Force. In March 1935 a defence white paper made the case for general rearmament. Opening the 1935 general election campaign as prime minister, Baldwin declared that he would not continue in office unless he obtained power to strengthen all the armed forces, and further defence white papers in 1936 and 1937 contained successively more massive rearmament programmes. 4 As Bassett showed in 1948, Baldwin's November 1936 passages had been misrepresented because quoted selectively. As other sentences made clear, he had not said that he failed to seek a mandate for rearmament in 1935 ; on the contrary, his comments on the difficulty with peace opinion referred to earlier years -' I am speaking of 1933 and 1934 ' -and he spoke of securing a large majority for rearmament at the 1935 election.
5 Yet Bassett's article made no initial impact on the prevailing verdict. Similarly, when Baldwin's second son published a reply to G. M. Young's biography in 1955, 6 its challenge to the orthodox view had only limited effects.
Only in the 1960s did specialist historians set aside the misrepresentations and turn from apportionment of individual blame to explanation of collective interactions, producing the balanced assessments now accepted in the superior general histories. 7 Yet the hostile verdict on Baldwin (' failed to rearm ') remains ingrained in popular impressions, and is reiterated in reference works and by those ostensibly expressing informed opinion. 8 It had become a myth -a public belief resistant to counter-evidence and professional historical revision -which was intrinsic to and sustained by larger myths about the 'low, dishonest' 1930s, the ' finest hour ' of 1940, and national regeneration under the wartime coalition and post-war Labour governments.
9 So strong were these myths that even as specific issues began to be reinterpreted, they continued to shape the overall intellectual and ethical scheme. For example, the generation of political leaders characterized by ' Cato ' in 1940 as ' little men ' shrank still further in Mowat's otherwise sensitive 6 A. W. Baldwin, My father: the true story (London, 1955). 7 For the November 1936 passages see e.g. Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 970-3, and M. Ceadel, 'Interpreting East Fulham', in C. Cook and J. Ramsden, eds., By-elections in British politics (London, 1973) , pp. 118-39, at pp. 119-23; and for a recent general verdict, P. F. Clarke, Hope and glory: Britain, 1900 -1990 (London, 1996 , pp. 186-7: 'the rearmament programme was seriously begun under Baldwin, pushed along more slowly than Churchill wanted but more quickly than the Opposition advocated'. 8 In 2003 these included most current biographical dictionaries and encyclopaedias, and the biography on the No. 10 Downing Street website.
9 For growing examination of such myths, see J. Baxendale and C. Pawling, Narrating the thirties: a decade in the making (London, 1996); A. Calder, The myth of the blitz (London, 1991); and M. Smith, Britain and 1940: history, myth and popular memory (London, 2000) . 1955 interwar history, to ' pygmies '. 10 Moreover, assertions made in the late 1940s and early 1950s to ' explain ' the supposed neglect on rearmament -Baldwin's ' complacency ', 'indolence ', indifference towards foreign issues -remained central to many later accounts of his leadership, preserved as unquestioned assumptions long after historians had discarded the original accusations and had understood the collective processes of decision making and the diplomatic, financial, logistical, and political constraints on policy.
Why did Baldwin's reputation collapse ? Why was more blame attached personally to Baldwin than collectively to the cabinet and its advisers, or even to the opponents of rearmament ? How did the worst possible accusations on rearmament become axiomatic, irrespective of the evidence ? How was this related to the wider 'myths' of the 1930s and 1940s ? Why did the earliest attempts to defend Baldwin's reputation only broaden the criticism? How did reassessment begin, and what obstacles did this face ?
Examination of Baldwin's reputation from his retirement in 1937 to the opening of the government records in 1967 -the point when more adequate historical scholarship became possible -provides a striking case of the contingent construction of historical interpretation, and the fragilities of 'contemporary history'. Baldwin was a casualty of the ' politics of history ', literally so. Beginning in partisan politics, the critical verdict against him was sanctioned by a compelling hindsight and adopted widely for mutual advantage. Its dissemination served ostensibly good public causes, yet demanded the doctoring of published speeches and selective recollection, concealment, or plain dishonesty about its proponents' own past actions or statements. It was extended by highly personal, almost perverse, choices by individual writers, and was challenged only under still stronger personal motivations. Consideration of Baldwin's reputation raises wider issues about the significance of ministerial memoirs, the status of psychological biography, the constraints of official secrecy and libel threats, the ability of powerful public figures to shape accounts of the recent past, and the claims of amateur as against professional historians. An overlap with the historiography of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement is evident, 11 but the history of Baldwin's reputation is especially poignant as a counterpoint to the history of Churchill's reputation. From 1940 the two were interdependent, and moved in inverse proportion to each other. Churchill's apotheosis as a ' maker of history', in the double sense of a successful wartime leader and the historian of his own life and times, 12 in crucial respects required, as it certainly sustained, disparagement of Baldwin. Both reveal important features of British public belief and intellectual standards during the 1940s and 1950s.
I
In the late 1930s Baldwin was the most respected figure in British public life. On his retirement he received warm tributes not just from grateful Conservatives and their National government partners, but also from members of the Labour and Liberal oppositions and a remarkable range of further organizations and individuals. Until early 1940 his good opinion as an elder statesman was valued by both members and critics of the government, from Chamberlain to Eden, Duff Cooper, and, on the left, Bevin, Citrine, and Cripps. National, imperial, and international bodies or causes sought him as a speaker, member, or chairman. In December 1938 he headed a transatlantic appeal for financial assistance for Jewish and other ' non-aryan ' refugees from Nazism, and during 1939 was twice invited to speak and broadcast in North America as a world leader in the antifascist and anti-communist causes.
13 He was also in demand among the reading public. From 1937 to 1939 volumes of his recent and past addresses were published or republished and went into popular editions, 14 while his new addresses continued to receive extensive newspaper reports. There was said to be 'keen competition among publishers' to obtain his memoirs, described by one prepared to offer him a substantial advance payment as ' the book that the world is waiting for '.
15
In contrast to other leading politicians, Churchill above all, Baldwin had wellconsidered reasons for making no preparations to secure his future reputation.
16
Nevertheless, after some reluctance he did assist an 'instant ' popular book to mark his retirement, in an episode which further indicates the heights from which his reputation would later fall. This ' tribute ', by the historian Arthur Bryant, placed Baldwin among ' the great Prime Ministers of all time ' for his work in social reconciliation, preservation of British democracy, and recreation of Conservatism as 'a great national creed '. On the main point of later controversy it stated 13 See Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 3, 57-9, 260, 345-9 ; also letters on his retirement in Cambridge University Library, Baldwin papers, vols. 152-7.
14 Service of our lives (London, 1937) squarely that he had worked to ' educate ' the electorate on the need for stronger defences, and at the 1935 election had sought and obtained a mandate for further rearmament.
17 As Bryant was a Conservative party educational official and friend of Baldwin these views are unsurprising. More significant was the book's purpose, to publicize and attract subscribers for a new National Book Association (NBA), which under Bryant's editorship, and with clandestine Conservative Central Office support, had been devised to resist the ideological influence of the Left Book Club.
18 Its organizers also wanted to undercut what they regarded as an unsuitable, because narrowly conceived, rival, the Right Book Club, as they believed that the socialist left and communists would be better resisted by a widely based ' national ' appeal, embracing liberals, moderate labour, and the noncommitted as well as Conservatives. As the best symbol of this intention, they persuaded Baldwin to become the NBA president. This was Baldwin as a positive ideological force, where a ' Baldwin book club ' (as some conceived it)
19 launched by a Baldwin 'tribute ' was considered capable of commanding large sales and combating the Left Book Club's remarkable success.
The NBA failed, partly due to business miscalculations, difficulties in book commissioning, and poor editorial selections -with Bryant's naive tolerance towards fascist states subverting Baldwin's ambition of rallying 'central ' opinion -but also because deteriorating international relations made the political atmosphere less favourable to its aims. This deterioration also began to affect Baldwin's reputation. Even at the time his 12 November 1936 passages had seemed damaging. While his cabinet colleagues were bewildered by what they regarded as a misleadingly weak account of their rearmament record,
20
Conservative critics of the defence preparations treated his words as a 'confession ' that the government 'never faced rearmament ' before 1935 for electoral reasons.
21
But it was events during 1938 that gave momentum to this meaning, as hindsight supplied politicians and commentators of various opinions with greater opportunities or pressures to ascribe blame. earlier rearmament programmes seem inadequate, Baldwin's November 1936 words offered an easy and useful explanation for the failure of British deterrence -but only when presented as an admission of evasion, neglect, or delay, and especially as an acceptance of personal responsibility.
Churchill's selected speeches on defence and foreign policy, published after the Anschluss to claim prophetic foresight in the past as his case for leadership in the future, included a truncated extract from Baldwin's November 1936 passages which gave the impression that he had not called for any rearmament during the 1935 election.
22 Despite an editorial assurance that ' nowhere ' was any Churchill statement omitted for reasons of 'political inconvenience ', this manipulation of Baldwin's words required the unmarked excision from Churchill's own speech during that debate of his statement that Baldwin had ' fought, and largely won ' the election on rearmament.
23 The selective Churchillian version of Baldwin's words was influential, and almost certainly the source for later misquotations ; forty years later it was still being used by Martin Gilbert in Churchill's official biography.
24 During the Munich debates another anti-appeaser, Lord Lloyd, responded to Baldwin's call in the House of Lords for all-party co-operation to accelerate national defence by charging him with ' responsibility for failure to rearm '.
25 Over the next twelve months followers of Chamberlain, presumably unaware that as chancellor of the exchequer he had determined the limits and priorities for armaments expenditure in 1934-5, asserted that Baldwin's ' refusal to re-arm ' had made Chamberlain's appeasement policies 'inevitable '.
26 This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain's biographer, Keith Feiling, notwithstanding the evidence about Chamberlain's role in his private papers.
27 The charge featured in newspapers owned by Beaverbrook, who had conducted a political feud with Baldwin since 1923 and would continue to pursue it long after Baldwin's death, establishing a hostile tone for much of the popular press until the 1960s. On the day war began, Peter Howard's Sunday Express column stated that Baldwin 'had not told the electors the truth about rearmament at the 22 W. S. Churchill, Arms and the covenant, ed. R. S. Churchill (London, 1938), pp. 385-6: the doctored extract excludes Baldwin's reference to Churchill's share of responsibility as chancellor of the exchequer for defence cuts in 1924-9 ; four further ellipses (three unmarked) affect the meaning; and it ends before Baldwin' Guilty men is testimony to a transformation of perspectives during May and June 1940. It was a tract for the time, not history but a lampoon without pretence to either balance or accuracy. As Foot himself later wrote, its ' notoriety ' was largely due to ' the reckless and wanton nature of [its] charges '.
41 Nevertheless, it had not just immediate success but an enduring influence, accorded ' classic ' status and credited with establishing an orthodoxy for the next twenty years, even among scholars.
42 The book's wartime popular appeal is easily intelligible : the shock of defeat, fears of invasion, and a collective mood of defiance created an appetite for ready explanations and scapegoats. By assembling earlier partisan criticisms into a comprehensive indictment of government in the 1930s, Guilty men articulated a sudden, angry, disillusionment with past leaders, made still stronger by a need to believe in the nation's essential soundness and capacity to survive, and by the intense impressions and myth-making capacities of Dunkirk, the fall of France, the Battle of Britain, the Blitz, and the broadcasts of Churchill and Priestley. In this atmosphere, the hostile interpretation of ' appalling frankness' and vilification of Baldwin himself -'despised for failing to rearm ' -became common currency, not only fed by the Beaverbrook press and other popular newspapers but accepted even in the serious journals.
43 It generated further waves of abusive letters to Baldwin 45 By the time the Guilty men authors were publicly identified in 1944, their interpretation had become so widely accepted that any doubts about their own records during the 1930s could not weaken its hold.
What may seem harder to understand is the afterlife and amplification of the ' guilty men ' interpretation among politicians, publicists, and academics. For this there are both general and particular reasons. The general explanation turns on the same simple device that appealed so strongly in 1940. By concentrating upon just a few 'guilty men ', Foot, Owen, and Howard unwittingly hit upon a peculiarly convenient understanding of the recent past. It was easier to argue by character assassination 46 than to investigate the economic, strategic, and logistical constraints on policy ; or to recall how different the military demands of 1940 were from those which anyone, including Churchill, had expected, even as late as 1939 ; or, in what was very much an insular discussion, to weigh the proximate cause of Dunkirk, the collapse of the French army. It was also an account which combined the satisfying qualities of hindsight, a stark contrast between right and wrong, and a dramatic and damning denouement. However, the convenience was less evidential and literary than political, ideological, and moral. The ' guilty ' were particular individuals -not the political, social, or economic system, not any one class nor any of the political parties, nor any newspapers (or their owners). By casting a harsh light on a few statements by the retired Baldwin and defeated Chamberlainites, the now unfortunate past statements of almost every other individual, group, and party could be consigned to decent obscurity. Many groups and individuals of quite different persuasions could reconcile themselves to some version of this account. Even the Conservative party was not denied exoneration, because the interpretation showed that in Churchill, Eden, Amery, and other anti-appeasers there were ' good ' Conservatives as well as 'guilty' ones ; and while many Conservatives might for a time dislike the attack on leaders and policies they had recently supported, it contained nothing objectionable in principle to Conservatism.
Above all, the 'guilty men ' interpretation came to register the convergence of the Labour and Liberal parties with Conservative dissidents after the Munich debate, consummated in the coalition of May 1940 (with Beaverbrook as a late arrival) and invested with intense patriotic and moral force by national survival, the ' people's war ', commitment to welfare reform, the crusade against fascist barbarity, and military victory. What, it transpired, had happened in May 1940 44 was not just a change of government but the end of a regime and creation of a new political order. This rupture enabled the wartime coalition partners and their followers to redeem or reinvent their ideological and moral credentials, whether as patriots, democrats, or social progressives, and to imply retrospective membership of what became a surprisingly large band of pre-war fellow-travellers with Churchill -the vital badge of respectability in post-war politics. As the ' guilty men ' interpretation supplied a foundation story for this new regime and a legitimation for these new commitments, many public figures acquired a stake in its credibility. The larger the stake, whether because pre-war positions required concealment or excuse, or because wartime and post-war positions were asserted as indefeasible, the more convenient the alleged inadequacy of the ' guilty men ' became. While Eden and other Conservative dissidents had the difficulty of absolving their membership of or support for Baldwin's and Chamberlain's governments until 1938 -and Beaverbrook and most other Conservatives until 1940 -the internationalists, socialists, Labour, and Liberals had potentially still greater embarrassment as opponents even of the National government's rearmament, let alone Churchill's calls for accelerated rearmament.
I I
All this did not occur at once, as the hostile verdict spread more slowly among politicians and publicists than the reading public. The particular reasons for its development lay in the political struggles of the remainder of the 1940s. Arguments about current issues generated similar accounts of the recent past. In May 1940 the coalition government partners agreed for the sake of national unity to refrain from recriminations against pre-war ministers, and until 1945 one prop of the wartime electoral truce was the formula that all parties shared the blame for any earlier shortcomings in defence and foreign policies.
47 Given their own records this suited Labour and Liberal leaders as much as former Chamberlainites, and this ' official ' account of mutual responsibility received some support in wider debate, certainly into 1941. 48 The broader left, however, experienced a similarly abrupt change of perspective to that of the Guilty men authors : Naomi Mitchison noted in June 1940 how 'very odd ' it was to find the New Statesmen ' going all militarist, blaming the government because it ''postponed conscription to the last moment '' etc. '.
49 Some radical publicists and politicians regarded the military defeats and alleged government failure as such fertile material for discrediting the Conservative party that defiance of their own party leaders and the political truce became a point of principle. It was concealed or forgotten that everyone on the left -from Liberal to Communist -had, as leading campaign themes at the 1935 election, publicly acknowledged that Baldwin wanted (in the words of the Labour party manifesto) a ' vast and expensive rearmament '. The most violent was A. L. Rowse, with his paradoxical mixture of Marxist, Lib-Lab, Keynesian, and Churchillian views, extraordinary egotism, and hatred of businessman-politicians. In Political Quarterly articles from 1938 to 1940 he anticipated some of the Guilty men charges, including the misrepresentation of Baldwin's November 1936 passages. But in a July 1941 article, republished in 1947, which even his editor thought psychologically false and potentially libellous, he pressed the accusations against Baldwin still further: an ' inferior man', dishonest and hypocritical, governing by 'fraud ' and ' confidence trick ', and ' betraying ' the British people ' more completely than we have ever known in our history ' . 50 Yet as a Labour candidate at the 1935 election Rowse had opposed Baldwin's advocacy of rearmament by declaring it a 'plain truth ' that Britain was already 'perfectly well equipped for all defensive purposes'.
51
The ' guilty men ' accusations were also reiterated in popular political tracts, mostly in a series from Gollancz, publisher of the Left Book Club and Guilty men, but also in Penguin ' specials ', and written by the radical Liberal MPs Geoffrey Mander and T. L. Horabin as well as by socialist publicists. Mander's 1941 book, attacking the coalition government formula that 'we were all wrong ' in the 1930s, was an early claim that the Labour and Liberal parties had been essentially Churchillian -' many … were absolutely right ' -achieved by emphasizing their eventual support for armed collective security while suppressing their (and his own) opposition to most national defence measures.
52 But the other tracts followed Guilty men in concentrating on ' exposures ' of alleged Conservative ' misdeeds ', dishonesty, and sympathy with fascism (' Tory Dictatorship '), and several produced Baldwin's ' dishonourable deception ' in 1935 as a prize exhibit. The electoral purpose was usually explicit. Most were published or, like Guilty men, republished in 1944-5, in anticipation of a post-war election. Your M.P. by Tom Wintringham, the Marxist ex-International Brigade officer and Common Wealth party publicist, declared that Baldwin's November 1936 passages ' alone ought to defeat every Tory MP at the next election '.
53 In a few cases the accusations were even extended to Churchill, on the grounds of his long hostility towards Soviet Russia. But as the 1945 Nuffield election study noted, the chief value of such partisan accounts of the 1930s for the political left was that they normally contrasted Churchill to other Conservatives, making it possible to attack the Conservative party without criticizing a popular wartime leader. Better still, they enabled Churchill's criticisms of Conservative ministers during the 1930s to be used against the Conservative party.
54
As the party truce dissolved into preparations for a post-war election in 1945, and with pre-war Labour resistance to rearmament now distanced by the war and coalition government, this tactic became attractive within the official Labour party. During the worst of the wartime abuse Ernest Bevin as minister of labour had told Baldwin of his anger that he was being blamed for ' a national failure, for which no one could escape responsibility ', a view of pre-war foreign and defence policies which he restated in the House of Commons during 1941. Yet such were the temptations of ready-made electoral ammunition that in April 1945 Bevin spoke publicly of the Conservatives having ' completely failed to prepare for defence ', and of the 1935 election as being ' won on a lie -a self-confessed lie ' by Baldwin.
55 Yet the idea of Conservative ' guilt ' had been so well disseminated by the wartime tracts that Labour leaders had little need to risk challenges on the point. Aside from one party election leaflet ('The guilty party ') and criticism of Churchill's caretaker government for including former Chamberlainites, the accusations mostly arose spontaneously from audiences at election meetings.
56
After the Labour election victory the recent past continued to be a live political issue, as Labour ministers -Morrison especially, as leader of the House of Commons -tried to protect themselves against Conservative exploitation of the government's difficulties by taunts against Conservative policies in the 1920s and 1930s.
57 By these means, the charges against Baldwin were transmitted into Labour party histories and the memoirs of Labour politicians.
Some Conservative replies to the wartime polemics were attempted. One party election leaflet declared that against ' socialist' opposition the National government had created the RAF and Royal Navy that had prevented invasion in 1940, while three others borrowed the radical titles of ' Guilty Men ' and ' Your M.P.' to list Labour statements and divisions against armaments, and to name the Labour and Liberal MPs who had voted against conscription.
58 Several unofficial tracts extended this device, exposing Labour and Liberal hypocrisy over rearmament by adopting the Guilty men tactic of extracts from speeches. The most substantial was Quintin Hogg's The left was never right, which attempted to create an inclusive 
59
As history Hogg's book was superior in accuracy and argument to Guilty men, but the politics were against it. No sustained Conservative counter-offensive developed. Defence of the National government was hardly a concern for Churchill and Conservative critics of Munich nor, now, for Beaverbrook, who provided the party's chief newspaper support ; and for most other Conservatives the effort to defend rearmament policies without implying criticism of Churchill, their main electoral asset, was too difficult. Baldwin, the politician with the widest pre-war electoral appeal, was now ignored in his party's election literature and speeches.
60
Conservative politics did not, then, generate a favourable or even balanced historical assessment of rearmament in the 1930s. Instead, after the 1945 election defeat the critical verdict was appropriated and reaffirmed for Conservatives, in the first volume of Churchill's war memoirs. It is now well understood that Churchill's differences with government defence and foreign policies were less substantial and constant than he and almost all commentators would claim after 1939, and that The gathering storm gave a highly partisan account of the 1930s, which depended on a questionable assessment of how Hitler might have been deterred.
61
Less obvious is the fluctuation in Churchill's attitudes towards Baldwin. Certainly he had been critical of delays in rearmament, and in private was frequently caustic towards him. But during the run-up to the 1935 election Churchill publicly pledged to support Baldwin as 'a statesman who has gathered to himself a greater volume of confidence and goodwill than any other man I recollect in my long public career ' -a position which he privately told Baldwin was 'indispensable to our safety at the present time ', indeed a ' blessing '.
62 While in part an obvious attempt to ingratiate himself back into government office, these statements also expressed a deeper concern : that in the face of Labour, Liberal, and peace opinion, Baldwin was best placed to win an election majority that would preserve the 1935 rearmament measures, described by Churchill as ' a most formidable and tremendous advance in British defence '. 63 After the National government had been re-elected and it became clear that Baldwin would not appoint him, he resumed his criticism. As prime minister in 1940, however, Churchill insisted on ministerial resistance to recriminations against the leaders of the 1930s, in his 18 June ' finest hour ' speech deprecating any 'quarrel between the past and the present' as jeopardizing ' the future '. 64 Conscious of the public abuse that Baldwin was suffering, Churchill was kind towards him, on three occasions entertaining him in Downing Street, asking his opinion on current issues and sympathetically recalling their differences during the 1930s. 65 After beginning work on his war memoirs he sent ' a message of comfort ' assuring Baldwin that he would be 'dealt with gently in the forthcoming book '.
66 After Baldwin's death and the publication of The gathering storm, Churchill accepted Baldwin's son's invitation to dedicate the memorial to him at Astley in May 1950, speaking of him as 'the most formidable politician I have ever known ' and (albeit with significant qualification) 'in domestic politics … one of the most capable leaders … for many generations '.
67
Why, then, did Churchill suspend his generous sentiments towards Baldwin when writing The gathering storm, even commenting privately that ' it would have been much better if he had never lived '?
68 As an autobiographer, biographer, and historian as well as a politician with an unusually controversial record, Churchill was sensitive to the importance of understandings of the past for present politics, alert to their possibilities and dangers, and accustomed to treating them as a flexible resource. Striking instances in his political practice include the manipulation not just of his own and Baldwin's statements about the 1935 election, but also of the phrase 'the years of the locust '. First coined by ministers to describe a period which emphasized Churchill's defence cuts while chancellor of exchequer during the 1920s, he instantly redefined and popularized it (to enduring effect) as applying to the years of the National government's responsibility for armaments in the early 1930s. 69 This pragmatic use of the past also influenced the first volume of The second world war. Originally intended precisely as the start of his memoirs of the war, during 1947 and early 1948 he extensively recast it to include a much longer account of the interwar years. The expansion of this section from five to twenty-one chapters 70 was hardly motivated by self-vindication alone : none doubted after 1940 that his criticisms of the National government had been 'right '. Contemporary concerns were more pressing. Humiliated by his 1945 election defeat and no longer in government, after his Fulton speech in March 1946 warning of the threat from Soviet Russia he had regained an international role by re-enacting his pre-war warnings against the threat from Nazi Germany. The redrafted interwar chapters would underpin this position as a Cold War prophet and the champion of both Anglo-American co-operation and a 'United Europe', by reclaiming his credentials as a uniquely successful diagnostician of military threat and by presenting events in the 1930s as 'lessons ' for the late 1940s and the future. 71 However different in style, The gathering storm was, like Guilty men, a tract for the times. The effects for Baldwin's reputation were similar. Again, the causes of the war and military defeat were attributed more to British ' unwisdom ' than to German aggression or the French collapse, and again the blame fell largely on individuals. The root of the difficulties again lay in the 1920s, though not (as it could not be, given Churchill's tenure of the Treasury) in economic policies, but in the defeat of the Lloyd George Coalition in 1922, which made Baldwin ' the ruling force in British politics' within a ' Baldwin-MacDonald Regime '.
72 Again Baldwin, even more than Chamberlain, was the key figure, because Churchill asserted that until 1936 the war could have been prevented if only Baldwin had kept his pledge to preserve air parity. 73 Churchill's ' statesman ' of 1935 was now diminished to a ' party manager ', thinking 'in majorities and aiming for a quiet life between elections'.
74 Dominating an ' administration more disastrous than any in our history ', Baldwin refused ' to face unpleasant facts ', lacked knowledge and interest in foreign issues, and wanted 'peace at any price '.
75 Many of Churchill's own warnings were quoted, but none of Baldwin's. Much was made of Baldwin's statement in May 1935 that he had been 'wrong' about future German aircraft production (' a shocking confession '), 76 but for the government little was noted apart from the July 1934 RAF programme ('belated and inadequate ') and secret ministerial consultations with Churchill on defence innovations. There was no indication of the successive increases and accelerations in RAF construction, nor even of the 1935, 1936 The gathering storm had an immense impact on interpretations of the 1930s. It had the literary power, epic qualities, and use of documents -helped by expert researchers and advisers -that made it seem exceptionally informed and authoritative. Above all, Churchill's extraordinary post-war international prestige and the massive sales of his book and its widely syndicated extracts transformed his personal interpretation into world history. It was not only endorsed by his wartime political and military associates, but embraced uncritically by intellectuals and historians who lionized him as a new Gibbon or Macaulay; and it established a political and moral perspective that even now remains influential in the imaginations of British and United States leaders. 78 Churchill's account was not derived from Guilty men and its radical successors, any more than he shared their political sympathies. The Labour and Liberal parties were not spared for being ' completely wrong and mistaken ' on armaments until 1936 and failing in ' duty ' on conscription in 1939 : they too, with the National government, were ' deeply blameworthy before history'.
79 As party conflict again sharpened from 1947, Churchill as Conservative opposition leader had the ironic task of defending his party against continued Labour use of the ' guilty men ' charges -counterattacking with sarcasm on the Labour record during the 1930s, and threatening that if Labour ministers tried at the next general election 'to revive these former controversies ' the Conservatives would publish a record of their past 'utterances '.
80 Nevertheless, despite the different perspectives of the two books, The gathering storm seemed to confirm the Guilty men accusations. It also extended the contemporary convenience of the repudiation of the leaders of the 1930s. By rallying to Churchill historically as well as politically the Conservative party now had a more presentable past to underpin their party's political recovery, while everyone on the left could continue to swim with the tide, adopting his indictment of the National government while ignoring his criticism of their own parties. From the late 1940s this shared account was reinforced by further ostensibly authoritative histories of the 1930s, from academics with particular reasons to deplore 'appeasement ' and by The Times's repudiation of its past support for Baldwin and Chamberlain written by a radical friend of Beaverbrook.
81 In these conditions, such plausible criticisms of the National government as having collectively failed to rearm 'adequately ' or ' quickly enough ' were habitually abridged -as they commonly still are -into the entirely false shorthand that 'Baldwin failed to rearm '. Baldwin's speeches warning about fascism, defending democracy, and justifying rearmament were overlooked and forgotten, because these contradicted the far stronger assumptions that he had completely misjudged the dictators.
Moreover, during these early years of the welfare state, economic management, and full employment, further criticisms were added, again as What emerged was a fused Churchillian-Labour-Keynesian interpretation dismissive towards government in the 1920s and 1930s, accompanied by hostile commentaries from Beaverbrook and his columnists and reviewers. This historical consensus had considerable public importance, as the real substance underlying the so-called ' political consensus ' of the 1950s. Given these political, ideological, and populist currents and their powerful moral charge, denigration of Baldwin and Chamberlain became intellectual and cultural norms which few had the incentive to question.
It might have been worse, if the one episode almost universally credited to Baldwin had been reopened to controversy. With difficulty, the duke of Windsor's legal advisers persuaded him not to base his 1951 memoirs of the abdication on ' aggressive and vindictive ' notes supplied by Beaverbrook, which presented Baldwin as an ' intriguer ' forcing the king off the throne ' in order to retrieve his own political fortunes '. 
I I I
Baldwin retained a loyal group of friends, and received some sympathetic letters. But few offered a public defence. Those meaning to be generous usually made no attempt to refute the criticisms, but in extenuation stressed his other qualities and achievements. When, with the customary respect for former prime ministers, both houses of parliament adjourned after Baldwin's death in December 1947, speakers from all parties praised his personal character, devotion to the House of Commons, and love for and embodiment of a version of 'England '. Some newspaper obituarists dwelt on his ' understanding of his countrymen ', or resorted to appealing to 'history' as likely to ' judge that he was too severely censured '.
84 Both those offering Baldwin wartime comfort and the more favourable obituarists did invoke the obvious alternative interpretation of his career, sketched by Bryant in 1937 : he had helped assimilate the Labour movement to parliamentary government and preserve national unity during the industrial troubles of the 1920s and the abdication. But so long as the charges on rearmament and the 'progressive ' consensus against interwar domestic policies remained strong, this line of defence had little purchase. In 1944 Bryant declined to consider an enlarged edition of his 1937 'tribute ' : people were ' too prejudiced '.
85
As shown by Baldwin's first, and for many years only, academic defender, an unusually unorthodox mind was needed to dissent publicly from the main charges against Baldwin. Bassett had been one of those scarce 1930s figures, a MacDonaldite, and after 1945 was still rarer in continuing to admire the National government, about which he published two important historical books during the 1950s. As a politics tutor at the London School of Economics he was appalled by what he regarded as the falsification and suppression of facts to suit prejudices about the interwar years, especially the obliteration of MacDonald's contribution to the Labour party by his senior colleague, Laski. He also thought it ' wicked ' that students were being 'misdirected ' by lecturers and writers who misquoted Baldwin's November 1936 passages.
86 Although his 1948 article was aimed principally at fellow political scientists it also treated 'Baldwin's confession ' as a ' legend ' with 'immense political influence', and included among its targets both Guilty men and The gathering storm. So entrenched had the distortions become that Bassett's method of exposure was to apply to a twelve-year-old public document the sort of close textual analysis normally applied to centuries-old manuscripts. Yet even here lack of access to the archives, compounded by Baldwin rebutted the charge of deception in 1935, he missed Baldwin's hypothetical, counter-factual, argument and mistakenly supposed that decisions had been taken in 1933-4 to postpone both rearmament and a general election. 87 The article had one immediate convert in Hoare, Baldwin's foreign secretary in 1935, who employed Bassett as a researcher on rearmament policies for his memoirs. Bassett's participation helped to make them the most cogent self-defence by a National government minister 88 -though like the memoirs of other Conservative ministers, they retrospectively established some personal distance from Baldwin himself. Copies of Bassett's article were circulated by Baldwin's friends, but otherwise it was either ignored or absorbed into the larger charge of delayed rearmament.
Why did Baldwin himself not reply to his critics ? Why, after his death, did those best placed to provide a defence not only concede the points of censure, but supply further material for the detractors ?
Baldwin was certainly hurt and depressed by the collapse in his reputation. He assumed that the Astley gates incident and obstructions to his second son's military promotion were vindictive, and he was dismayed by ugly stories about himself: ' innumerable people believe that I went to America [in 1939 ] to hide ! '. But he tried to be philosophical, shrugging off the enmity of the Beaverbrook press as inevitable and the abusive letters as understandable in the circumstances. He also took the sensible and dutiful view that any public statement by himself would only provoke further vilification and that he should not exacerbate controversy during wartime, the more so because he admired Churchill's leadership. 89 There were, however, prior reasons for his reticence. Even before the war Baldwin stated that he would write 'no memoirs or nonsense of that kind '.
90 His reasons were in part personal scrupulousness and public principle. He thought it ' a pitiful thing when men tried to justify their actions and speeches after retirement', and he ' did not wish to write things which would inevitably cause grief and pain ' to others.
91 Abstention from public comment about former colleagues was included in a pledge he made on his retirement, to withdraw altogether from party and ministerial politics. 92 He was also sensitive to the claims of official secrecy. He had experienced the difficulties created by ministerial memoirs while overseeing the vetting of Lloyd George's War memoirs, when some of the official papers cleared for publication had aroused grievances. This had contributed to a tightening of the 1934 rules on public use of cabinet documents, which Cabinet Office officials interpreted as prohibiting any published reference to cabinet proceedings. 93 Nor would Baldwin at first encourage any biographer. His family associations with popular biographical subjects -William Morris, and his own cousin, Rudyard Kipling -had alerted him to the frequent gulf between subject and biography, and given him a distrust of all biographers. He shared Kipling's distaste for writers who 'coined [money] out of Lives while the subjects are still alive' or sought to lay bare 'all the life and intimacies of men as soon as they are dead ', and adopted his scathing description of these practices as ' The Higher Cannibalism'. 94 Both particularly disliked biographers' use of 'psychological methods ', making what Baldwin regarded as improper connections between ' a man and his work' to produce 'caricature '. He would not have Lytton Strachey's books in his house.
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Another reason for Baldwin's reticence was a detached perspective towards his own career. He understood that proximity and hindsight distorted judgement, while the lapse of time brought a truer assessment -an intelligent grasp of the superiority of historical knowledge, first learned from Montagu Butler at Harrow.
96 He believed that 'no man can write the truth about himself ', and observed of Lloyd George's memoirs that a participant in past events found it difficult to avoid writing 'in the light of what has happened since '. Congratulating Asquith's widow on the imminent official biography of her husband, he spoilt the sentiment by observing that 'it is so difficult to tell the truth -or even to dig it out -within a generation '. 97 In the late 1920s he failed to soothe Churchill, always yearning for instant fame, with the view that 'one can't expect to see the result of one's own work ' ; and in 1940 he affronted rather than consoled a dying Chamberlain with the observation that ' whether our work has been good or not will not appear until long after we have passed away, and no worrying on our part will affect the verdict '. 98 He had long declared that 'only history' could properly judge the work of himself and other politicians, because the current generation lacked both adequate information about their actions and knowledge of the aftereffects. As he retired he commented that ' only 50 years hence could the real value of his or any Premiership be judged '.
99
Baldwin's willingness to leave his public career to the verdict of 'history' and his distaste for investigations into private lives not only did early disservice to his reputation. It also caused difficulties for later historians, working with an access to political records and with expectations about personal evidence far beyond those he could have foreseen. Although he knew from publication during the 1920s and 1930s of political diaries, biographies, and memoirs (including Churchill's Great War volumes) that some ministers and officials collected documents in order to present their own version of events, he himself never wrote diaries, nor did he modify his habit of conducting political business verbally so as to have letters or memoranda for the record. The letters and papers he received were preserved by his secretaries and family, not kept by himself for later use. Consequently, historians have been denied the access to Baldwin's private thoughts that they have for those of Churchill, the Chamberlains, Amery, and other contemporaries. Baldwin also unwittingly complicated later judgements by not being entirely consistent to his best intuitions. The adamantine self-certainty which Neville Chamberlain maintained even after May 1940 was temperamentally alien to him, 100 and he was not so immune to hindsight that he did ask himself and discuss with others whether he might have acted differently in the mid-1930s. From such self-questionings some of Baldwin's interlocutors gained an impression of an uneasy conscience, particularly when -as with Churchill and G. M. Young -they were unsympathetic on the sensitive issues, causing him either from politeness to concede more than he meant, or to retreat into taciturnity.
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Yet as Baldwin's discussions with more sympathetic individuals show, although he occasionally thought he might have been more active on foreign policy, on rearmament 'his conscience [was] clear '. Through all the criticism he remained confident that ' in years to come unbiased historians would say he could not have done more than he did '.
102 His own assessment of his career rested on the themes taken up by Bryant and several obituarists : social reconciliation, educating Labour in parliamentary methods, and establishing the Conservatives as a national party. 103 Here a September 1939 letter from the Labour MP, David Kirkwood, became a comfort (he had copies made for friends), as a statement by a radical 'Clydeside ' socialist of the 1920s that the national co-operation in war mobilization owed much to his efforts for industrial peace. 104 Baldwin knew his ' appalling frankness ' and 'unsealed lips ' passages had been misjudgements -' stupid ' and 'foolish ' -but he was still puzzled by the misunderstandings, where these were not obviously malevolent. His defence was consciously historical in form, stressing the need to understand conditions in 1933-5 : ' the critics have no historical sense '. After so long accusing him of weak leadership they now assumed that he had been a dictator, responsible for everything that had happened. Information on German rearmament had been unreliable, Hitler still seemed to want agreements, and his later actions could not have been foreseen, any more than the fall of France had been. Given the strength of peace feeling and illusions about collective security, precipitate large-scale rearmament on apparently ' flimsy ' grounds would have split the country and jeopardized the re-election of the only party grouping committed to national defence ; instead he had presented rearmament carefully and successfully, and in 1935 won a majority for general rearmament.
105
It was not Baldwin himself but his private secretary, Geoffrey Fry, and his closest advisers, Tom Jones and J. C. C. Davidson, who were most concerned to arrange a defence of his reputation. Baldwin remained reluctant : first mentioned in September 1940, it was late 1942 before he would entertain the idea, perhaps influenced by the experience of talking with Feiling about Neville Chamberlain's biography. Even so it took a further two years of ' explanation & persuasion ' before he agreed to commission a book, and then on condition that it would be published after his death.
biographer, helped with information on his early life and answered Jones's questions on political incidents.
108 It is indicative of the decline in Baldwin's reputation by 1947 that The Times printed only a shortened version, although there remained sufficient interest for it to publish the full text as a separate pamphlet.
109
Jones's memoir drew on his own familiarity with Baldwin, the knowledge of several of his secretaries and officials, and an intelligent understanding of interwar government. It remains among the best, and generally most sympathetic, of the short Baldwin biographies. But it added two elements to the critical interpretation. The first was indirect and peculiarly contingent. As the ' real explanation ' for Baldwin's decision for the 1923 protectionist election, Jones quoted from his note of a Baldwin recollection in September 1935. Speaking while exercised by the electoral challenge of Lloyd George's Council of Action, Baldwin said that twelve years earlier one of his purposes had similarly been to pre-empt Lloyd George. Jones's account probably became the source for the same claim made in The gathering storm, 110 and it certainly struck a chord with another of Baldwin's former colleagues. Amery had resented Baldwin's resistance to his own imperial economic proposals, and had a general impression that in his political style Baldwin sought to be ' as unlike Lloyd George as possible '. When writing his autobiography in 1951 he reread Jones's 1947 memoir and obtained and published a copy of his full 1935 note, which crystallized a new and larger idea. Amery now concluded that for Baldwin ' the one dominant motive all through … was fear of Lloyd George and his influence ', and that this was the main explanation not only for the 1923 decision but also for two further, emblematic, actions: his appointment of Churchill to the Treasury in 1924 (to separate him from Lloyd George) and his agreement to form the 1931 National government (to exclude both Lloyd George and Churchill from office).
111 In turn Jones, always interested in Lloyd George's influence, himself adopted Amery's view in his 1951 Lloyd George biography, and then in the edition of his own diaries and his Dictionary of national biography article on Baldwin, both prepared in 1953-4. He did so even though it meant overlooking a fuller explanation of the 1923 decision that Baldwin had sent him in 1940, in which Lloyd George was not a significant consideration.
112
A dubious 'recollection ' and a jaundiced impression had been conflated by supposedly authoritative writers to construct what in later historical accounts became -despite its inherent implausibility -a general interpretation, almost a ' fact ', which reinforced the view of Baldwin as inadequately focused upon the crucial national issues : that a principal aim of his whole career was to exclude Lloyd George from power.
113
The second legacy of the memoir was more direct. Although Baldwin and Jones shared some social and moral sympathies, in other respects their perspectives were different, in ways which Jones did not always fathom. As a radical, Labour-voting admirer of Lloyd George and an administrative 'man of business ' -and one whose readiness with policy suggestions was not always appropriate to his position and knowledge -Jones considered Baldwin the cautious Conservative, anti-statist, politician to be 'impervious to detail ', having ' only the sketchiest acquaintance ' with much cabinet business, and reluctant to take decisions. Although Jones qualified these statements and suggested balancing strengths, his account did much to elevate a common impression of an aspect of Baldwin's style into a determining aspect of his leadership and government policy : he was liable to ' bovine indolence ', and 'posterity will have hard things to say of his inertia '.
114 Particular instances of these traits were also implied. In 1935-6 Jones had been an early and enthusiastic appeaser, visiting Germany to meet Nazi leaders and trying to arrange a meeting between Baldwin and Hitler. His efforts came to nothing because Baldwin, not trusting the Germans 'an inch ', eventually preferred the judgement of his foreign secretary, Eden -who deprecated the proposal as a German tactic to weaken Anglo-French relations -rather than the urgings of someone, even a friend, with no foreign policy experience. For Jones this was a missed opportunity which he increasingly regretted as Anglo-German relations deteriorated, until by early 1938 he hated Eden and thought that ' a heavy load of guilt lies on S. B.'. In his memoir Baldwin was presented not just as ' ill at ease ' and lacking interest in foreign affairs, but even as distrusting and disliking 'foreigners ' -notwithstanding the evidence of their many conversations on foreign issues in his own diaries, and his knowledge of Baldwin's foreign trips and friendships.
115 On the main accusation, Jones in mitigation argued that Baldwin had decided ' to educate the country ' in the need for rearmament. But he forgot that in a June 1935 article he had described Baldwin in November 1934 bringing ' public and pacific opinion to accept the drastic positive measures for aircraft production … now in operation '. Writing with the perspectives of 1937 and after Baldwin's ' appalling frankness ' passages, Jones now described the rearmament preparations as beginning only after June 1935, and accepted the now conventional view that Baldwin had been ' slow to act '.
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These themes were absorbed most readily by the recipient of Baldwin's commission, chosen on Fry's and Jones's recommendation. As an historian, man of letters, public servant, and Conservative political commentator, G. M. Young seemed a good choice. Baldwin had been acquainted with him since the mid1930s, occasionally seeking his advice on literary matters. As respectively president and chairman of the British Association for International Understanding they had corresponded during the early war years, and Young had been an occasional guest at Astley Hall. Baldwin admired Young's writings, and considered him well qualified to produce the only kind of book he would contemplate about himself -not a personal biography but a life explained by his times, or as Young had written of Victorian England, a Portrait of an age. ' No one ', Baldwin wrote, ' could [better] picture the mentality of that strange post war era in England from 1918 to the out-break of the present war. '
117
Young worked with considerable advantages. He could talk with Baldwin about his career, spending around thirty days at Astley for the purpose, and Baldwin's political papers were made available to him at his Wiltshire home by Fry, a close neighbour. As Baldwin had authorized the book, his family, friends, and former associates answered questions or lent documents.
118
During 1945 Young was shown material in the Royal Archives, and the king and his secretaries commented helpfully on his draft abdication chapter. Although not suspected by readers when his book was published nor later by historians once the same records became publicly available, he was also granted a privilege denied to Feiling three years earlier. By special dispensation which Baldwin obtained personally from Churchill, Young was the first person other than ministers and officials to read the interwar cabinet records -stretching a provision under the 1934 Cabinet Office rules which coincided with the reason for Baldwin's changed attitude towards official secrecy : access to official documents ' might … be given for the purpose of vindicating the memory of a deceased Cabinet minister ', where that memory had been 'injured '. 119 Young had at his disposal a range and quantity of sources not available to other biographers and historians for another twenty years, and in some cases much longer.
120
Even so, by 1948 Young despaired of writing anything adequate. He became disillusioned with Baldwin himself and suffered some form of nervous breakdown over the book, twice offering to abandon it and finishing it in 1952 only with the persuasion and assistance of his publisher, Hart-Davis.
121 Even during the final production stages there were difficulties and postponements, which reveal further constraints on interpretation of interwar politics in the 1950s. Although the book is now noted for its criticism of Baldwin, before publication the greater concern was its criticism of other figures, still alive and powerful. These included ministers in the 1951 Conservative government, who considered it appropriate to use civil servants to protect their historical reputations.
Young's proofs survived scrutiny by the Cabinet Office (a condition of his access to its records) with only slight changes to remove direct references to cabinet papers and named officials, and by libel lawyers (the publisher's precaution) with dilution of a few comments on individuals, notably the duke and duchess of Windsor. But these processes placed copies of the text in other hands. Eden, always worried that his first period as foreign secretary in 1935-8 might tarnish his subsequent reputation as an ' anti-appeaser ', was ' profoundly disturbed ' by Young's account of the 1936 Rhineland crisis, which suggested that the British government had restrained the French from taking military action against Germany. After mediation by a fellow cabinet minister, J. P. L. Thomas, only resulted in Young proposing what Eden regarded as insufficient changes, he turned for heavier pressure to his permanent secretary, declaring that the issue affected not just his own reputation but also those of Baldwin and ' the Cabinet and our Party and the country '. Although cabinet officials still thought Young's account a ' fair summary of the Cabinet minutes', the Foreign Office appeal to national interests persuaded Brook, the cabinet secretary, to prevail on HartDavis to impose further amendments. Consequently several sentences in chapter 22 are not Young's but those of the Foreign Office librarian, who invoked the authority of The gathering storm against the cabinet records : such was the contemporary ascendancy of Churchill's published opinion over even the best indeed in 1946 he used his prime-ministerial dispensation to Baldwin and Young as a precedent when asking Attlee to allow access to official papers for his own researchers: Gilbert, Churchill, VII, p. 235.
120 For instance, Young read cabinet records on the abdication crisis not released in the PRO until 2003. He was also responsible for the unique record of the cabinet discussion on Hoare's 1935 resignation being unsealed (though it is uncertain whether he was allowed to read the contents): Brook note, 19 June 1946, CAB 21/4476, explaining the incident recounted in Naylor, A man and an institution, p. 253. Young spent many weeks from September 1945 to June 1946 reading papers in a Cabinet Office room, for which he was given his own key.
121 Many of these and following details are in the G. M. Young file in McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa, Hart-Davis papers, hereafter, unless otherwise stated, the source for Hart-Davis correspondence. But see also Hart-Davis letters in CUL MS Add. 7799, and R. Hart-Davis, Halfway to heaven (Stroud, 1998), p. 38. documentary evidence.
122 Another copy of Young's proofs reached Beaverbrook, who was advised by his lawyer and by Robert Blake, the Oxford historian he had commissioned to write the biography of Bonar Law, that the book contained defamatory statements about himself and Churchill. The main complaint was over Baldwin's claimed view that in the early 1920s they, together with Lloyd George and Birkenhead, had been bent on enjoying power for its own sake, were ' degrading public life ', and wanted a war against Turkey for the purpose of relieving unemployment. After setting libel lawyers on to Young and Hart-Davis, Beaverbrook sent the proofs to Churchill, who found additional causes for complaint. An embarrassed Brook -who, on a matter not affecting policy, was now careful to say he was only acting privately, not as the cabinet secretary -was instructed to inform the publishers that Churchill considered the book to contain untrue and ' ill-natured comments and charges ' against himself. The combination of legal threat and prime ministerial displeasure brought rapid compliance and agreement on yet more changes, negotiated with the lawyers.
123 These now involved much work, expense, and delay because the whole first edition had been printed and stitched : seven pages had to be cut from 7,800 copies, and the revised and reprinted pages glued back by hand.
124
Why, though, had Young found it hard to write the book at all, and how did an authorized defence of Baldwin produce yet more accusations against him ? Young blamed much of his difficulty on the nature of Baldwin's papers ; they contained, he wrote, so few personal letters and notes as to be ' utterly worthless ' for any biography better than a version of the ' Annual Register '. He even made this into a grievance against Baldwin's sons, imagining they had destroyed and delayed delivery of important papers, and demanding an increased share of the royalties as financial compensation.
125 All researchers on interwar British politics will sympathize with Young's frustration at the scarcity of Baldwin's political letters and his insubstantial presence even in cabinet minutes ; but it is surprising that he found so little inspiration in the now 233 volumes of Baldwin's political papers, and thought the cabinet records ' very bleak and not of much value '.
126 The real problems lay not with the sources, but with Young himself. He was not, like Feiling, a research historian familiar with political records, indeed he was contemptuous of what he called 'the machine-turned researcher '.
127 He was an essayist, an impressionist whose favourite devices were allusion, anecdote, classical tropes, and literary quotations.
128 As Kitson Clark noted, Young's Portrait of an age had been less 'history' than precisely a ' portrait ', containing ' that selection of facts which commended itself to the vision of the artist ', considered from a self-consciously personal perspective.
129 He had a poor understanding of how to handle original sources, pursue and assess evidence, and preserve accuracy. He wrote on documents, mislaid or forgot to return them to owners, and incorporated those from which he wanted to quote in his manuscript, defaced with his own text or typing instructions.
130 For all his complaints about inadequate sources, he did not interview or ask for documents from some obvious figures -Churchill, Eden, Amery, the widows of Bridgeman and the Chamberlains, Tom Jones and Baldwin's cabinet secretary, Hankey. When Young did contact Baldwin's associates, rather than encouraging independent testimonies he tended to state his own views and to seek confirmation for them with leading questions.
131 As he worked he trusted to his normally prodigious memory, despite being aware that it was liable to make slips and to elaborate the evidence : he even gave this trait a playful name (' the Imp ') and wrote an essay about it. The result was similar to that found by Kitson Clark in the Portrait of an age : almost every quotation and even some basic factual details in the Baldwin book were inaccurate, where not corrected at the last moment by Hart-Davis.
132
The larger reasons for Young's difficulties were his assumptions, his questions, and the kind of book he chose to write. He tried to be balanced, and stressed some positive features. He admired Baldwin's love of classics, his political oratory (hiding his dismay at discovering that he used speech writers), his resistance to the ' press lords ', and his stand against Churchill on India. More than any previous account, he developed the case for Baldwin as a great domestic prime minister, whose constitutionalism and sympathy towards the Labour movement 'saved Parliamentary Government ' and helped create the national unity of 1939-40.
133
But these were not his principal concern. He settled his main line of interpretation early, in 1946, and thereafter regarded much in Baldwin's career as clutter, complaining that his theme ' got clogged with rubbish about miners ' wages, and Beaverbrook, and the crisis of 1931, and the Red Letter '.
134 Despite the richness of his sources, Young was unable to detach himself from the dominant view about Baldwin. He took it for granted that his main problem, and the focus for the whole book, was to explain why Baldwin ' was slow to take up Germany's challenge to start rearmament '.
135 He soon concluded that the conventional charge was right : Baldwin had 'concealed the truth to win an election '; as Bevin had said, he 'lied '. 136 He was therefore predisposed towards the verdict of The gathering storm (which, like most contemporaries, he considered an ' immortal ' book) ; indeed, he printed Churchill's severest sentences and the notorious index entry (' party before country ') at the start of his own book. He accepted the usual mutilated version of Baldwin's November 1936 passages, and was so fixed in his assumptions that he dismissed Bassett's article as ' of no importance '.
137
As Young's correspondence demonstrates, his focus on rearmament determined what evidence he wanted to find. When it could not be found in the places he expected, he developed further fixed ideas, which in turn determined which type of material he would use and which he would ignore. On discovering that Baldwin's papers and the cabinet minutes had little on his personal views, Young did not ask to see the cabinet committee and imperial defence papers, which contained the real evidence about rearmament. Nor did he examine Baldwin's speeches in detail, even though the main charge turned on his public statements. Nor did it occur to him that he might have misconceived the problem, and should ask different questions. Instead, he decided that a conventional biography was impossible, and that he was left with two choices. The first was the book which Baldwin thought he had commissioned Young to write : ' a political history of the inter-war years with Baldwin as the main figure among a number of other figures '.
138 The alternative, and the one he chose, was precisely what Baldwin had dreaded. Young found that ' the psychology of the subject is so absorbing that the history is moving further and further into the background '. 139 He did not inform Baldwin of his decision. In 1946 Baldwin still believed that Young shared his own ' dislike for the modern psychological approach in biographies ', and was writing ' a history of the inter-war years' which might be an 'introduction ' to a much later biography.
140 Nor did Young inform his readers. He stated why his book was not a ' fully documented life ', but omitted to specify the ' different form ' that it took. This created misunderstandings about its status and quality : as an authorized book, it was assumed to be an authoritative record. Yet, like Portrait of an age, it was, as Young himself privately wrote, ' not history ': it was a 'psychological study ', more than a 'contribution to political history '.
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Though more sophisticated than Guilty men and other wartime polemics, like them it based explanation more on purported personality defects than political analysis.
Balancing his admiration for some of Baldwin's qualities with an assumption of his shortcomings over rearmament, and characteristically resorting to a classical model, Young chose a single overarching theme for the book, that of Aristotelian tragedy : 'the good man with the weak spot which unfitted him for the situation he had to face '. 142 Baldwin's weakness, he decided, was that ' popular sympathy had become a drug which he could not do without. And it had been administered in quantities which must have made deprivation an anguish.' Consequently he ' could not say hard things, when hard things needed to be said ' : it followed that Baldwin could not tell the full truth about Germany and rearmament to the people.
143 Consequently too, Young claimed that Baldwin suffered great anguish over his unpopularity in 1940 : 'They hate me so. '
144 Once these premises are understood, much that is otherwise puzzling about Young's work falls into place. Although Baldwin talked readily with Jones about rearmament and the 1935 election, Young found him elusive on these matters. Given Baldwin's dislike of ' psychology ', this is not surprising : he would have been embarrassed by Young's intrusive questions. Yet Young regarded that evasiveness as significant : this convinced him that the ' popular verdict ' was true, and he made much of it in his book. He deduced that for Baldwin the 1935 election was a 'sensitive spot ', about which he had a ' bad conscience '. From there he further deduced that Baldwin had ' lost his nerve ' after the East Fulham by-election and could not bring himself to press for adequate rearmament.
145
The problems with all this are plain : the successive and self-reinforcing suppositions, and the arguments from silence, both documentary and verbal. Quite how Young decided that Baldwin craved popular affection is unclear, unless it followed from his initial assumption -that Baldwin had not been explicit about rearmament from fear of public criticism. What is certain is that Young had no documentary evidence. Such psychological speculations were not susceptible to written proof, and no contemporary Baldwin statement about East Fulham has survived. This explains Young's complaints about the deficiency of the papers he had seen, his disinclination to pursue further sources, and what close inspection reveals to be strikingly low standards of 'evidence '. He wanted testimonies about personal ' character ', not more documents about politics. His despair about the book from 1948 came as he realized the difficulty of building substance around his assumptions. As he told Hart-Davis, he would just have to ' rely on my prose to carry off the truth that the subject has ceased to appeal to me'.
146
This prose included conjecture, insinuation ('it seemed to me', ' I often thought ') and presentation of particular incidents as general traits (' he would '), all given apparent legitimacy through reported conversations and an implied intimacy with Baldwin (' we talked ', ' he told me ', 'I noticed '). His substance, when detached from his premises, amounts to little more than impression and hearsay.
147 It came in two parts. The first, on Baldwin's supposed dependence on public affection, consisted of cumulative psychological innuendo. He was the only child of an invalid mother, a lonely boy, a humiliated schoolboy, an unsuccessful undergraduate, a disappointment to a domineering father, shy with women, and between him and his wife (notwithstanding their seven children) 'there was not much passion in their mating ' -a particularly unprovable, as well as tasteless, assertion. Consequently, Young argued, Baldwin's personality was not natural but artificial, ' built-up ', the more so because as a surprise late-comer to leadership he had to improvise a claim to authority. Also, because he found close personal relationships difficult and felt burdened by 'the ultimate loneliness ' of the premiership, Baldwin found his happiness in large gatherings, in the House of Commons and still more in public meetings, 'giving and taking affection without personal intimacy and individual concern '. So he resolved to capture public admiration by making himself representative of his largest audience. Although by temperament and partial descent a ' Celt ', he ' deliberately and by election ' adopted the persona and ' played the part ' of an ' Englishman'.
148 A Baldwin statement during the special circumstances of the abdication crisis -' my worst enemy could never say that I do not understand the people of England ' -became for Young a key not just to a supposed timidity over rearmament, but to his whole career.
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The second set of arguments were those validated by Jones's memoir and Churchill's Gathering storm. As his Aristotelian theme required Baldwin to be unfitted to his situation, so Young made a great deal of his supposed ignorance and aversion to foreign and defence matters, even (with no known evidence) creating the still-current legend that when foreign affairs came before the cabinet he ' would close his eyes ' and ask to be woken after the discussion had finished. This failing arose, Young wrote, because ' he could never bring his mind to bear on anything that did not interest him ', a claim established by an insistence on Baldwin's ' indolence ': ' his inertia, his laziness, his easy-going ways '.
150 Again Young found personal confirmation, making no allowances for a man in his late seventies when observing Baldwin's short attention span, nor for Baldwin's diffidence when in his well-known first sentence he described Baldwin's invitation to write the book as offered ' somewhat languidly '.
151 From these alleged traits followed assertions about Baldwin's 'neglect of much that a Prime Minister ought not to neglect ', his dislike of paperwork and decision making, and the time he spent in the House of Commons, in order to avoid officials and colleagues.
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Young even elevated Baldwin's temperament into general political narrative, where the course of various episodes, particularly the aftermaths of the General Strike and Hoare-Laval crisis, were determined by his supposed fluctuation between impulsive exertion and nervous relapse (an account formed partly from analogy with Young's own mood swings). 153 As an example of negligence he seized on an account from Citrine, the TUC secretary, about Baldwin finding in 1935 that trade union leaders were ready to assist rearmament but then (as Young understood it) failing to pursue discussions, a story which confirmed his disenchantment with his subject, not any effort to substantiate it. 155 Churchill's private judgement should also be noted : 'ill-natured ', 'ill-conceived ', a 'very inadequate appreciation of Mr. Baldwin '. 156 Young was so disappointed by the 'bleak and unfriendly reception ', that he asked Jones to take over his commission to write Baldwin's entry for The dictionary of national biography.
Churchill, could have done more. He even had the temerity to challenge The gathering storm as containing passages 'open to serious criticism ', and suggested that in future editions Churchill should consider revising his verdict on Baldwin.
159
The most substantial reply came from Windham Baldwin, the son whose campaign to vindicate his father had begun with his asking Churchill to speak at the Astley memorial. 160 He had tried to help Young in his early research, but as Young's nervous complaints as well as his line of interpretation became apparent he decided that he should not attempt to influence the book's arguments. Instead, even before Young had finished his book he began collecting material for a published response, which developed into an answer to the whole post-war denigration of his father, presented in biographical form.
161 Windham Baldwin was a businessman, not a historian or writer, and had no particular political attachments. Nor had his father confided political information and opinions to him. But he had one great advantage over other commentators : his utter disbelief in the statements made since 1940 about his father's character, which made him immune to the interpretation of 1930s government and politics that depended on his supposed character flaws. He also had explanations of how the criticisms had developed and persisted, giving him what was at that time a further interpretative strength : distrust of the ostensibly most knowledgeable writers. When Jones asked for his comments on Young's book to help him in writing the Dictionary of national biography article, Windham declined in a remarkable reasoned criticism of Jones's own published views on Baldwin. Jones, a man with vast experience of public life, was startled into the comment that 'in a long life I cannot recall receiving a letter which has so shaken me '. It had some effect : Jones collected fresh opinions from Baldwin's former officials, read the Bassett article and reread Baldwin's defence speeches, so that even while incorporating some of Young's material his article was more circumspect than his earlier memoir. 162 In Windham's book, the belittlement was explained as a legacy from interwar party enmities and frustrations, Baldwin's long struggles with Beaverbrook, Rothermere and their newspapers, and his outspoken scepticism about ' intellectuals'. 163 His private explanations were more pungent, but also perceptive. Amery, Hoare, Cooper, Elliott, and most of Baldwin's other ministerial colleagues had been ' debrained and dememorized by … false post-war propaganda ' and the ' Heroic Virus spread by Churchill '. Nor had the professional experts done better : the ' professors of All Fool's College, Oxford and almost all historians … failed to comprehend, partly through dealing in second-hand sources, partly through prejudice, and partly through susceptibility to propaganda and winstonworship '.
164
Windham Baldwin assembled some unpublished political material, and obtained from Citrine the full story of Baldwin's 1935 enquiries about TUC attitudes on rearmament, confirming that Bevin, not Baldwin, had let the prospective discussions lapse.
165 But in fulfilment of his father's will he sent Baldwin's political papers to Cambridge University Library. He made little use of these papers himself, because having identified the two root charges against Baldwin he understood that their weaknesses would be best exposed by other sources. Against the assertions about his character and particularly Young's damaging innuendos about its formation, Windham used his own knowledge and family papers which Young had largely ignored. His candour about Baldwin's schoolboy punishment for some mildly indecent scribblings had the unintended effect of encouraging further psychological interpretations of his politics. But Windham's own emphasis was on his father's contented childhood and happy marriage ; his religious faith, moral earnestness, and ethic of service ; his sincerity, modesty, and straightforwardness ; his vigour, crispness in despatch of business, and trust in delegation to experts; and his shy, highly strung temperament which made public meetings an agony -in displaying a man who was not capable of deception, neglecting duty, or chasing popularity.
166 Against the accusations about rearmament he grasped, as the academics had not done, that as the central issue was his father's public statements, extensive study of his speeches was required. He bought the House of Commons debates for 1932 to 1937 to add to volumes of newspaper cuttings of Baldwin's extra-parliamentary speeches, and from these demonstrated his extensive and detailed engagement in foreign and defence debates. He showed, as none since Hogg had done, the relentless Labour and Liberal opposition to rearmament, and he went further than Somervell in stating not just that The gathering storm contained ' unreasonable arguments and aspersions ' but even that Churchill's speeches in 1932-6 were unrealistic and often ' superficial and self-contradictory'.
167 He argued that Bassett's revised interpretation of the November 1936 passages did not go far enough, because Baldwin had not meant that heavy rearmament was postponed in 1933-4 : nothing larger than the successive RAF increases had been considered necessary or desirable, given contemporary information about German armaments, international obligations to seek disarmament, and a continuing prospect of arms limitation. Nevertheless, the government had begun rearmament in 1934, and Baldwin's careful advocacy had persuaded an electoral majority to accept an unequivocal commitment to increased rearmament at the 1935 election. The phrase 'no great armaments ' was an assurance 'to pacify the pacifists ' that the government was not warmongering. 168 As Windham privately summarized his interpretation, with 'skill and courage ' Baldwin had ' walked the finest tightrope' between precipitate rearmament which would have divided the nation and escalated international tensions, and inadequate rearmament which would have left Britain defenceless in 1940. That Britain had withstood the unexpected disintegration of Belgian and French resistance was testimony to the work begun in the mid-1930s. The prevailing interpretations should be inverted. It was not on the constitutional issues of 1926 and 1936 but on rearmament in 1934-5 that Baldwin did his ' most difficult and miraculous ' work. Rightly understood, Baldwin, not Churchill, was the heroic figure of the 1930s.
169
There would have been another significant book on these issues in the 1950s, but for a further entanglement with the Cabinet Office's vigilance over official papers. Sir Graham Vincent, a former Downing Street and Committee of Imperial Defence official who also wished to vindicate Baldwin's memory, offered to collaborate with Windham Baldwin in developing suggestions made in his book that delays in rearmament were caused primarily by deficiencies in the apparatus of defence staff and committees. Such a study would have had a considerable impact on the debate, and it had a promising start. In a replay of his father's request to the prime minister of the day on Young's behalf, in 1957 Windham asked Harold Macmillan, an old friend, for access to Cabinet Office records, though now, more pertinently, to its defence papers. Again on the principle of allowing special facilities for relatives defending a statesman's injured reputation, Macmillan and Brook agreed to the request. One discovery by Vincent produced further evidence of the weight of received opinion on the 1930s. Cabinet Office officials were surprised and worried to find that in July 1936 Baldwin had spoken to Churchill and the defence deputation of having won the 1935 election on a 'perfectly free hand on arms '. As this statement was not reported in The gathering storm's account of the meeting and contradicted Churchill's notorious accusation against Baldwin, there was concern over whether it would be 'politically expedient to reveal it now '. Eventually, however, publication of the whole book was prevented by the Cabinet Office's contorted efforts to stop confidential information being used in memoirs by former officials. the main author, and as the latter rejected as dishonest Brook's suggestion that he should present it as his own sole work, the Cabinet Office felt it had to insist on a convention that debarred civil servants from publishing books using official documents. 170 
V
Publishers had been nervous about Windham Baldwin's biography, not least because Churchill was still prime minister when they assessed it : he himself took advice over possible libels, and disguised Churchill's name when printing an extract from a document. Publishers also thought the book a ' risk ' because Baldwin remained unpopular, and was ' a permanent Aunt Sally for every political journalist'. 171 Predictably, this turned out to be true in the Beaverbrook and Labour press. But other reviewers were impressed, even moved, by the account of Baldwin's character, and most, including Churchill's son, now agreed that Young's book had been too harsh. A few accepted that the accusations about the 1935 election and November 1936 passages were unjust, but more commonly the contrast between the book and received opinion produced confusion. Some concluded that as an act of ' filial piety ' its case was overstated. Others took the critical interpretation back a stage : Baldwin's personal merits were admitted, but it was argued that good intentions were no substitute for tough-mindedness on international and economic problems.
172
Nevertheless Windham Baldwin's book began to change informed assessments of Baldwin. At the very least these became less critical, if only because attempts to accommodate his account made these assessments more complicated. Broader opinion was also gradually becoming less hostile. As the Second World War receded and as the Cold War advanced, earlier summary views and moral simplicities about British policy in the 1930s could seem less convincing. As Conservative political dominance and acceptance of the welfare state continued through the 1950s, a more favourable perspective became possible, that of Baldwin as a forerunner of the ' progressive ' Conservatism of Butler and the verdicts were now more reasoned and measured. For historians the earlier hostile stereotype had gone, though it persisted as Baldwin's public reputation ; the new feature was a gulf between the historical assessments and the popular myth. Nor did the legacy of political partisanship immediately disappear. When in the early 1980s several Conservative MPs campaigned for a statue of Baldwin to be placed in the House of Commons lobby, it was blocked by Michael Foot, now Labour party leader but still brandishing Guilty men. In the 1990s, however, even this political residue had dissolved : not only a Conservative prime minister but even his Labour successor could appeal to Baldwin as an exemplar of the politics of social reconciliation. 
